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SECTION 1983 ACTIONS IN NORTH DAKOTA: 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF AGENCY POLICIES AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS 
JARED RIGBY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Title 42, Section 1983 of the United States Code1 prohibits public 
officials from violating individuals’ civil rights and liberties guaranteed by 
the Constitution and federal law.2  The Act seeks to accomplish its objective 
by providing a civil cause of action for plaintiffs whose civil rights and 
liberties are infringed by government actors.3  Section 1983 is frequently 
employed to sue state and local law enforcement and corrections officers.4  
Although the legal elements of Section 1983 apply equally throughout the 
United States, the effect of Section 1983 may vary depending on each 
jurisdiction studied.5  For instance, individuals in some areas of the nation 
seem to be particularly at risk of having their individual constitutional rights 
violated.6  In other jurisdictions, however, the government appears to be 
burdened by an unusual amount of frivolous Section 1983 claims.7 
To date, no scholarly study has concentrated solely on the use or effect 
of Section 1983 in North Dakota.8  As such, the first objective of this 
 
*Jared W. Rigby graduated from the University of North Dakota with Juris Doctorate and 
Master of Public Administration degrees in 2007 and 2008, respectively.  Jared gives the most 
immediate thanks to his wife and children; their love, sacrifice, and support are priceless.  Special 
thanks also to Dr. Steven Andrew Light and Dr. Andy Hultquist for their friendship, patience, and 
assistance. 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. John L. Worrall, Culpability Standards in Section 1983 Litigation Against Criminal 
Justice Officials: When and Why Mental State Matters, 47 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 28, 31-32 
(2001). 
5. See Darrell L. Ross, Emerging Trends in Correctional Civil Liability Cases: A Content 
Analysis of Federal Court Decisions of Title 42 United States Code Section 1983: 1970-1994, 25 
J. CRIM. JUST. 501, 511-12 (1997) (reporting that the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth 
United States Federal Circuits decided 60% of the cases studied and reasoning that “these five cir-
cuits share a common feature of large correctional populations, both at the prison and jail levels”). 
6. See id. at 510 (determining that between 1970 and 1978, prisoners prevailed in 89% of 
cases involving unjustified discipline). 
7. See id. (showing that among the cases studied from 1987 to 1994, the government success-
fully defended itself in 90% of the Section 1983 claims involving allegations of speech 
violations). 
8. But see Michael S. Vaughn et al., Assessing Legal Liabilities in Law Enforcement: Police 
Chiefs’ Views, 47 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 3, 6, 16-17 (2001) (presenting empirical findings 
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project is to determine whether the burden imposed by Section 1983 on 
North Dakota agencies is comparable to the burden shouldered by other 
jurisdictions.  In addition, this project seeks to discover the trends associ-
ated with Section 1983 claims (i.e., the constitutional amendments, provi-
sions, and agency policies most frequently implicated), both generally and 
in North Dakota specifically.  Furthermore, the study provides recommen-
dations by which North Dakota law enforcement and correctional agencies 
may strengthen their administrative policies. 
Comparative analysis involving the State of North Dakota, but unre-
lated to Section 1983 claims, occasionally report North Dakota to be unique 
among the majority of other jurisdictions.9  In regard to the characteristic 
trends of Section 1983 claims, however, the answer initially appears to be 
that many of the national trends commonly associated with Section 1983 
characteristics hold true in North Dakota.  Within this large umbrella-like 
hypothesis is a more finite and quantitatively based null hypothesis: there is 
no statistical relationship between the North Dakota policies implicated in 
Section 1983 claims and those policies implicated in other American 
jurisdictions. 
Section II contains a review of the literature and empirical studies 
involving Section 1983 issues.10  Section III provides an explanation of the 
methodology employed in the current study.11  The results of the study are 
presented in Section IV.12  In Section V, the results of the current study are 
discussed generally in light of empirical studies involving Section 1983 
issues.13 
 
relating to a quantitative study of Section 1983 liability among police chiefs in Texas); see also 
Ross, supra note 5, at 507-12 (providing empirical data pertaining to Section 1983 claims in the 
federal correctional setting generally). 
9. See, e.g., Dean J. Hass, Falling Down on the Job: Workers’ Compensation Shifts From a 
No-Fault to a Worker-Fault Paradigm, 79 N.D. L. REV. 203, 209 (2003) (“North Dakota is one of 
five states that operate an exclusive state fund to insure workers’ compensation risk.”); see also, 
e.g., Christopher Paul Fischer, “I Hear You Knocking, But You Can’t Come In”: The North 
Dakota Supreme Court Again Declines to Decide Whether the State Constitution Precludes a 
Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 588 N.W.2d 846, 76 
N.D. L. REV. 123, 128 (2000) (stating that North Dakota has uniquely protected the privacy of an 
individual’s home by maintaining legislation that requires law enforcement to knock-and-
announce themselves prior to entry). 
10. See discussion infra Part II (focusing on the history of Section 1983, the text and inter-
pretations of Section 1983, and Section 1983 claims in law enforcement and corrections arenas). 
11. See discussion infra Part III (studying all reported Section 1983 cases involving law 
enforcement and correctional agencies in North Dakota between January 1997 and December 
2007). 
12. See discussion infra Part IV (reporting the agencies involved, characteristics of plaintiffs, 
number of cases reported, legal authorities and arguments employed, and policies implicated). 
13. See discussion infra Part V (analyzing whether Section 1983 is a burden to North Dakota 
agencies, determining how the statistical trends of Section 1983 cases in North Dakota compare to 
other jurisdictions, and offering recommendations for strengthening North Dakota policies).  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
State and local government officials that violate individuals’ rights may 
be sued under a variety of legal actions.14  In this way, Section 1983 serves 
as merely one of many causes of action available to individuals that believe 
the government has violated their rights.15  A great deal has been written 
about Section 1983 and its predecessor statute over the years.16  The earliest 
court cases discussing issues at least somewhat related to Section 1983 
claims date back to the late 1800s and early 1900s.17  In the 1960s, the 
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Monroe v. Pape18 led to a signifi-
cant amount of scholarly research and discussion revolving around a host of 
Section 1983 issues.19  This section presents the history of Section 1983, 
introduces the text and relevant interpretation of Section 1983, and explains 
the relationship between Section 1983 claims and the professions of law 
enforcement and correctional officers. 
A. HISTORY OF SECTION 1983 
After the resolution of the Civil War, many public officials in Southern 
state and local governments maintained Ku Klux Klan (KKK) member-
ship.20  Intent on maintaining a system of white supremacy under girded by 
government action and terror tactics, officials with KKK affiliation used 
their public positions to violate the constitutional rights of African-Ameri-
cans.21  To combat these illegal and dangerous tactics, Congress enacted the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866,22 which criminalized violations of federally 
guaranteed rights perpetrated by state and local government officials.23  In 
1871, Congress added civil remedies to the statute and codified the 1866 
 
14. See Ross, supra note 5, at 502 (discussing petitions of habeas corpus); see also Dennis E.  
Hall et al., Suing Cops and Corrections Officers, 26 POLICING: AN INT’L J. OF POLICE 
STRATEGIES & MGMT 529, 532, 535 (2003) (speaking of negligence in performance of duty). 
15. See Randy Means, The History and Dynamics of Section 1983, POLICE CHIEF, May 1, 
2004, at 6, available at www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_ 
arch&article_id=299&issue_id=52004 (discussing various methods of suing government 
officials). 
16. Hall, supra note 14, at 529. 
17. See, e.g., Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430, 438-40 (1904) (discussing the need 
to protect individuals’ constitutional rights against state governmental officials); Virginia v. Rives, 
100 U.S. 313, 334 (1879) (stating that the government acts through the decisions of agencies and 
agency officials and that such acts may potentially violate constitutional rights and liberties). 
18. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
19. Hall, supra note 14, at 529-30. 
20. Michael S. Vaughn & Lisa F. Coomes, Police Civil Liability Under Section 1983: When 
Do Police Officers Act Under Color of Law?, 23 J. CRIM. JUST. 395, 395-96 (1995). 
21. Id. at 395. 
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
23. Id. 
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and 1871 laws as Title 42, Section 1983 of the United States Code, the “Ku 
Klux Klan Act.”24  At the time Section 1983 was enacted, no controversy 
ensued regarding either its necessity or application.25 
B. THE TEXT AND SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1983 
Generally speaking, Section 1983 prohibits government officials from 
violating the constitutional rights of individuals.26  If such rights are vio-
lated by government officials, Section 1983 provides the person injured 
with legal and equitable relief.27  In order to prevail in a Section 1983 
claim, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant (1) acted under color of 
law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of his or her constitutional or federal law 
rights.28  Section 1983 is a method of remedying federal rights, and is not in 
and of itself a source of substantive rights.29 
1. Acting Under Color of Law 
From the time of the statute’s enactment in 1866 until 1961, a person 
acted under color of law only if that person’s questionable acts were made 
in accordance with the person’s lawful authority.30  Practically speaking, 
this meant that an officer that engaged in misconduct was considered to be 
acting outside the scope of his or her authority, thus not acting “under color 
of law.”31  Since that time, however, the Supreme Court has, through a 
series of four cases, modified its interpretation of what it means to “act 
under color of law.”32 
First, in United States v. Classic33 the Court considered whether 
Louisiana election officials violated individuals’ constitutional rights by 
altering and fraudulently counting ballots in a primary election for 
congressman.34  The defendants argued that they were not government 
 
24. Id. 
25. Vaughn & Coomes, supra note 20, at 395-96.  At least one reason that Section 1983 
originally stirred little controversy was that Reconstruction efforts, of which Section 1983 was 
one, fell apart, thereby leaving the Act unenforced for many decades. Lisa E. Key, Private 
Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under § 1983: The Supreme Court’s Failure to 
Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 303-06 (1996). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979). 
30. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941); Vaughn & Coomes, supra note 20, at 
397. 
31. Classic, 313 U.S. at 326; Vaughn & Coomes, supra note 20, at 397-98. 
32. Vaughn & Coomes, supra note 20, at 397-98. 
33. 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
34. Classic, 313 U.S. at 307-08. 
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officials at the time of the questionable actions; instead, they were employ-
ees of the Democratic Party.35  The Court disagreed and reasoned that the 
action was taken “under color of state law” because the defendants were 
given power by state law to count and certify election ballots, and then vio-
lated state law (a criminal action) by fraudulently tampering with the elec-
tion ballots.36  In short, Classic unlocked the door to what was previously a 
deadbolt interpretation of viewing the misconduct of public officials as 
action outside the scope of authority. 
Second, the Court turned the handle when it issued its ruling in Screws 
v. United States.37  In that case, the Court faced the decision of whether 
certain law enforcement officers violated a citizen’s Fourteenth Amendment 
due process rights when the officers hit the citizen with clubs until he was 
unconscious and died.38  The Court held that, in violation of criminal law, 
the officers used excessive force, and that “officers who . . . perform their 
official duties are included [as having taken action under color of law] 
whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it.”39 
In Monroe v. Pape,40 the Court kicked the door wide open with regard 
to the application of the Classic and Screws extensions of the “under color 
of law” standard.41  In Monroe, the Chicago police barged into Monroe’s 
residence in the middle of the night without a search warrant.42  At gun 
point, Monroe and his family were made to stand without clothes while 
police officers searched their home for evidence relating to a two day-old 
murder.43  Monroe was then detained at the police station for ten hours 
without being advised of the charges or being allowed to call his attorney.44  
Prior to Monroe, the Court’s “under color of law” standard extensions 
applied only to criminal law violations.45  In Monroe however, the Court 
held that a person that acts under color of law to deprive a person of consti-
tutional or federal law rights may be subject to civil liability.46  The Monroe 
 
35. Brief of Defendant and Appellees at *13-14, Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (No. 618), 1941 WL 
52906. 
36. Classic, 313 U.S. at 326. 
37. 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 
38. Screws, 325 U.S. at 92-94. 
39. Id. at 111. 
40. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
41. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180, 191 (stating, in essence, that extending the Court’s “under 
color of law” standard, as used in the criminal context to that of the civil context, is in accordance 
with Congress’s intentions). 
42. Id. at 169. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 184-87. 
46. Id. 
       
424 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:419 
Court also held that the City of Chicago could not be sued using a Section 
1983 claim because it was not a “person” within the meaning of the 
statute.47 
And fourth, in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of 
New York,48 the Court extended the reach of Section 1983 even further by 
considering how the statute should be applied to a local government-defen-
dant.49  In 1978, a group of female employees sued their employer, New 
York City, alleging that an official policy requiring pregnant employees to 
take unpaid leaves of absence before the employees so desired, violated 
their constitutional rights.50  The Court held that while a local government 
cannot be sued “for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents,” 
the government may be liable when its “policy or custom” inflicts the 
injury.51  Some of the reasons that the Court expanded the application of 
Section 1983 were that civil rights law encourages broad remedies, congres-
sional debates of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 did not expressly forbid 
such an interpretation, and a case decided two years after enactment of the 
Act suggested such inclusion.52 
2. Depriving Plaintiff of Constitutional or Federal Law Rights 
Proving that a person was deprived of a constitutional or federal law 
right in a Section 1983 suit is accomplished by identifying the official’s 
alleged misconduct and then sufficiently showing that the alleged miscon-
duct is a violation of a constitutional or federal law right.  For instance, in 
 
47. Id. at 190-92. 
48. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
49. Monell, 436 U.S. at 662. 
50. Id. at 661. 
51. Id. at 694. 
52. Id. at 685, 688-89. Interwoven through the review were two separate but related princi-
ples that, if left unmentioned, would constitute a less-than-thorough explanation of Section 1983 
claims; first, an entirely different line of cases exists wherein the Court interpreted the meaning of 
“policy or custom.”  See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 119 (1988) (stating that 
those with actual authority to act on behalf of the government is determined on a case by case 
basis in the state courts); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (holding that 
“where action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the municipality is equally 
responsible whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly”); City of 
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985) (“Proof of a single incident of unconstitu-
tional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident in-
cludes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can 
be attributed to a municipal policymaker.”); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 
(1980) (stating that “neither history nor policy supports a construction of [Section] 1983 that 
would justify [a grant of] qualified immunity . . . to the city”).  And second, although Section 1983 
only provides remedies for civil rights violations involving state and local government actors, 
Bivens actions provide citizens with the Section 1983 equivalent of remedies for civil rights viola-
tions in the federal context.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 395-96 (1971). 
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Blades v. Schuetzle53 an inmate-plaintiff argued that prison officials vio-
lated his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punish-
ment by failing to protect him from the attack of another inmate.54  The 
plaintiff also argued that a corrections officer violated his Fourteenth 
Amendment right of equal protection by making a statement the plaintiff 
considered to be racially discriminatory.55 
In relation to the first argument, the court held that although prison 
officials may have been negligent in protecting Blades from the attack of 
another inmate, the officials’ actions did not satisfy the standard of deliber-
ate indifference required of cruel and unusual punishment arguments.56  
With regard to the second argument, the court held that even though the 
officer’s race-based comments were “thoroughly offensive,” without more 
the comments were not an act of race discrimination.57  Therefore, although 
Blade’s claims were ultimately found to be without merit, his case provides 
an accurate illustration of the requisite structure needed to successfully 
prove deprivation of a constitutional right.58 
Section 1983 does not require the plaintiff to prove the defendant was a 
government agent actually acting in his or her official capacity at the time 
of the alleged violation.59  Instead, a person may be liable for civil damages 
if he or she acted under color of law and deprived another person of a right 
given through constitutional or federal law.60  Although Section 1983 has 
the potential to rule with a heavy hand, it also has limitations.61  Perhaps its 
greatest limitation is its scope—besides the two elements of the statute 
(which act as narrowing agents), Section 1983 only reaches state and local 
governments, as entities, when their policies or customs inflict the injury.62 
 
53. 302 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 2002). 
54. Blades, 302 F.3d at 803. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 803-04. 
57. Id. at 805. 
58. See id. at 803-05 (upholding the district court’s order of summary judgment because the 
plaintiff could not prove the defendant’s “requisite state of mind” and the discrimination claim 
was not actionable). 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
60. Id. 
61. See Worrall, supra note 4, at 31-32 (recognizing that Section 1983 potentially applies to 
all state government officials and that an immense amount of Section 1983 litigation has arisen 
since about 1970); see also Means, supra note 15, at 5-6 (recording many Section 1983 judgments 
as being in the million dollar range). 
62. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 
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C. LAW ENFORCEMENT/CORRECTIONS AND SECTION 1983 CLAIMS 
Section 1983 is currently being used to sue officers in state and local 
law enforcement and correctional agencies more than any other group of 
officials; similarly, no cause of action is employed as frequently as Section 
1983.63  Many law enforcement officers are concerned that they will be 
sued in their personal capacities for a work related decision and that their 
departments will refuse to represent them.64 
Some proponents of the contemporary interpretations of Section 1983 
argue that the statute is vital and fulfills its intention to reduce police mis-
conduct.65  In addition, these proponents state that Section 1983 provides a 
“check” on law enforcement officers and enables the number of police 
abuses to be reduced.66  Furthermore, Section 1983 serves an important role 
in ensuring that the police are reminded that they are subject to the law just 
like other citizens.67 
On the other hand, many law enforcement and correctional officers 
argue that although the purpose of Section 1983 is to deter police miscon-
duct, Section 1983 as it now exists, goes too far.68  Some of these officers 
state that their fear of being sued causes them, at times, to not act when they 
otherwise would.69  In this way, Section 1983 potentially breeds inaction 
and may have a type of paralyzing effect on officers.70  In turn, unwarranted 
inaction thwarts justice, increases the likelihood of potential harm to the 
public and officers—a type of occupational hazard, and interferes with job 
performance.71 
Recognizing arguments from proponents and opponents of Section 
1983, scholars have conducted a number of relevant studies.72  The studies 
(both quantitative and qualitative in nature) combine to serve an important 
 
63. Worrall, supra note 4, at 28, 31-32; Means, supra note 15, at 1. 
64. Vaughn, supra note 8, at 3, 6, 16-17. 
65. Id. at 4. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 3. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. See Ross, supra note 5, at 502 (discussing civil liability in the correctional setting); see 
also Sarah Eschholz, Police Sexual Violence and Rape Myths Civil Liability Under Section 1983, 
29 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 389, 390-405 (2001) (researching ways in which perpetrators rationalize sex-
ual violence of victims); Vaughn, supra note 8, at 16-23 (exploring police chiefs’ views regarding 
civil liability); Robert D. Hanser, Inmate Suicide in Prisons: An Analysis of Legal Liability Under 
42 USC Section 1983, 82 PRISON J. 459, 465-75 (2002) (studying the trends and legal challenges 
facing correctional officers in regards to inmate suicide); Hall, supra note 14, at 529 (addressing 
the attitudes and experiences of law enforcement and correctional officers that potentially face 
civil liability). 
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function in understanding how Section 1983 claims are being used contem-
porarily.  The five cases most similar in subject matter centered on the fol-
lowing issues: (1) trends of civil liability in correctional facilities; (2) legal 
liabilities in law enforcement; (3) legal liability of inmate suicides in prison; 
(4) civil liability for perpetrating sexual violence; and (5) differences and 
similarities of police officers’ and correctional officers’ experiences in be-
ing sued civilly. 
1. Trends of Civil Liability in Correctional Facilities 
The first and most relevant study concentrated on the trends of 
correctional civil liability in the United States.73  Prior to the study, a 
significant amount of research existed regarding Section 1983 and its appli-
cation to law enforcement across the nation, and especially in the correc-
tional setting.74  However, a gap existed in identifying the correctional poli-
cies that posed “the greatest risk of litigation.”75  Seeing this, Professor 
Ross, the project’s architect, conducted an extensive study of Section 1983 
actions across the entire United States District Court system.76  The proj-
ect’s focus spanned the years of 1970 to 1994.77 
Ross found that during the first five years of his study, the number of 
Section 1983 lawsuits filed increased by about 200% and the number of 
individuals incarcerated increased by 45%.78  In addition, during the second 
five years of the study, the number of Section 1983 filings increased 
approximately 100% and the number of prisoners increased by almost the 
same amount.79  Similar increases were found throughout the rest of the 
project.80 
Interestingly, 92% of the cases studied were filed without the assis-
tance of legal counsel.81  In addition, Ross concluded that about 4% of the 
prison population studied filed a Section 1983 lawsuit during the span of 
the study.82 
Ross also studied trends associated with the various types of lawsuits.83  
In doing so, he identified sixteen categories in which inmates frequently file 
 
73. Ross, supra note 5, at 502. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 505. 
76. Id. at 502.  
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 507. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 509; see 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1976) (establishing the federal pauper’s statute). 
82. Ross, supra note 5, at 507. 
83. Id. at 508-11. 
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Section 1983 lawsuits.84  For instance, during the period of time studied, 
about 4% of the cases were brought under an argument of cruel and unusual 
punishment.85  Similarly, the plaintiff claimed the violation of free speech 
rights in another 4% of the cases.86  And, in approximately 7% of the cases, 
a failure to protect a claim was argued.87  Overall, Ross acknowledged that 
the number of Section 1983 claims would continue to increase proportion-
ately to any increase in the prison population.88  At the same time, however, 
Ross speculated that legislation aimed at limiting frivolous law suits may 
cause the number of Section 1983 claims to decline significantly.89 
2. General Legal Liabilities of Law Enforcement Officers 
In 2001, Professor Vaughn recognized the unique status of opinions 
regarding civil liability for law enforcement officers.90  Vaughn’s objective 
was to provide empirical evidence as to whether police civil liability law 
has in fact caused “lawsuit paranoia” and severely limited enforcement of 
the law.91  Vaughn was also committed to discovering whether suing police 
officers was exposing the extreme cases of police misconduct that many 
people claim is commonplace in the police subculture.92 
Vaughn surveyed police chiefs in Texas.93  Sixty-one percent stated 
that the potential for being sued “only mildly affected or had no effect at all 
on their departmental functions.”94  In addition, 92% of those surveyed 
disagreed with the statement that “members of the public should not be able 
to bring a civil lawsuit against the police.”95 
In a similar way, only 36% of the participants reported being sued 
personally, or having one of their subordinates sued, in the previous three 
years.96  Of those civil suits reported, the most frequently claimed miscon-
duct was assault and battery or excessive force; false arrest, imprisonment, 
 
84. Id. at 508. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 513. 
89. Id. 
90. Vaughn, supra note 8, at 3-4. 
91. Id. at 3. 
92. Id. at 3-4. 
93. Id. at 5. 
94. Id. at 6. 
95. Id. at 7. 
96. Id. 
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or detention; and unlawful searches or seizure.97  Most interesting was the 
finding that although 86% of the police chiefs felt that “some lawsuits filed 
against the police help make police more professional,” 68% of police 
chiefs could not state any policy that was actually altered as a result of 
actual or potential civil litigation.98 
3. Prison Suicides and Civil Liability 
In 2002, Professor Hanser studied the legal liability of correctional 
officers in inmate suicide cases using the framework of Section 1983.99  
Previous to the study, the Court held that “deliberate indifference” toward 
an inmate’s serious illness or injury was a violation of the cruel and unusual 
punishment of the Eighth Amendment.100  However, the Court had not yet 
ruled as to whether an officer’s alleged actions in relation to an inmate’s 
suicidal tendencies were subject to the deliberate indifference standard.101  
Therefore, Hanser analyzed inmate suicide cases within the various state 
and lower federal courts in order to see how the issue was being handled.102 
As part of the findings, Hanser concluded that a narrow interpretation 
of the deliberate indifference standard existed in Section 1983 cases.103  
Many times, this meant that as long as the defendant-officer acted “respon-
sibly and professionally,” the officer was not liable under Section 1983.104  
The study also considered the policies frequently at issue in various Section 
1983 cases.105  For instance, in one case, the prison’s psychiatrist was sued 
for, among other things, not committing an inmate to a forensic hospital.106  
The psychiatrist argued that he closely applied medical standards and prison 
policy criteria in choosing not to commit the inmate to the hospital.107  In 
view of such considerations, Hanser recommended that corrections admin-
istrators review their mental health policies with an eye toward protecting 
individuals’ constitutional rights.108 
 
97. See id. at 7-8 (finding that, of the cases reported, the most frequently claimed misconduct 
was assault and battery/excessive force 22%; false arrest/imprisonment/detention 19%, and unlaw-
ful search/seizure 10%). 
98. Id. at 7, 12. 
99. Hanser, supra note 72, at 459-60. 
100. See id. at 460-61 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 474. 
104. Id. at 475. 
105. See id. at 465-66, 468 (discussing the policies at play in Carrigan v. State of Delaware, 
957 F. Supp. 1376, 1376 (D. Del. 1997) and Jess v. Wagner, No. 94-7211 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). 
106. Id. at 467 (citing McKee v. Turner, 124 F.3d 198, 198 (6th Cir. 1997)). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
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4. Civil Liability for Perpetrating Sexual Violence 
A crime of increasing frequency occurs when police and correctional 
officers improperly use their authority to commit sexual violence.109  A law 
enforcement or correctional officer perpetrates sexual violence when he or 
she uses implied public trust or legal access to engage in sexual relations.110  
Police sexual violence (PSV) includes acts such as “unobtrusive viewing, 
sexual harassment, kidnapping, rape, and murder.”111  Section 1983 is regu-
larly used to hold police and correctional officers liable for perpetrating 
PSV.112 
In Eschholz’s 2001 study of various state and local police and correc-
tional agencies in the United States, eighteen Section 1983/PSV cases were 
categorized according to three criteria.113  The criteria included whether 
each case established the color of law requirement, violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause, or violated the Eighth Amendment’s 
cruel and unusual punishment’s clause.114  The project used content analysis 
to determine how “rape myths” operate in the law enforcement and correc-
tional settings.115  In doing so, Eschholz found that many lower courts have 
legitimatized the PSV-plaintiff claim that a violation of “bodily integrity” is 
a violation of the liberty right granted by the Fourteenth Amendment.116 
In addition, and although not tested conclusively, it may be within the 
Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence to consider PSV cases a 
violation “when police act with improper motives to egregiously, arbitrar-
ily, and capriciously harm citizens.”117  And lastly, in order to successfully 
argue that a PSV incident violated the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and 
 
109. See Eschholz, supra note 72, at 389-90 (researching ways in which perpetrators ration-
alize sexual violence of victims).  See, e.g., Ksl.com, Former Police Officer May Have Used 
Badge to Obtain Sexual Favors, www.ksl.com/index.php?nid=148&sid=2998888 (last visited 
May 30, 2008) (reporting that a police officer admitted to threatening to cite a woman for child 
neglect if the woman did not perform certain sexual favors for the officer). 
110. Eschholz, supra note 72, at 389. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 390. 
113. Id. at 389. 
114. Id. 
115. See id. at 390 (explaining the methodology of reading through various PSV cases and 
categorizing the cases based on whether the perpetrator appeared to justify the PSV by telling 
himself or herself: (1) “the victim asked for it,” (2) “no means yes,” (3) “s/he owes me,” (4) 
“denial of injury,” (5) “no one can be raped against their will,” (6) “the victim cried rape,” (7) 
“sluts/whores cannot be raped,” or (8) “women cannot rape”). 
116. Id. at 400 (citing Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 628 (4th Cir. 1997); Bennett v. 
Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 584 (5th  Cir. 1996); Battista v. Cannon, 934 F. Supp. 400, 405 (M.D. Fla. 
1996); Carney v. White, 843 F. Supp. 462, 466 (E.D. Wis. 1994)). 
117. See id. (making inferences from the Court’s holding in Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 
152 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1998)). 
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unusual punishment clause, the Court will likely require the plaintiff to 
“show that: [1] the assault violated evolving standards of decency[,]118 or 
failed to provide inmates with the minimum civilized measure of life’s 
necessities[;]119 and [2] was perpetrated with the culpable mental state of 
deliberate indifference[,]120 or malicious and sadistic intent for the very 
purpose of causing harm.”121 
5. Police Officer Liability Versus Correctional Officer Liability 
In 2003, Professor Hall examined the differences and similarities of 
police officers and correctional officers, particularly the attitudes and expe-
riences of the two groups toward civil liability.122  The study focused on 
whether factors such as occupation, rank, experience, and education affect-
ed officers’ attitudes toward and experiences involving civil lawsuit.123  The 
study found that substantially more police officers than correctional officers 
reported being sued civilly.124 
Overall, Section 1983 is the most commonly used legal device to hold 
officers responsible for violating individuals’ constitutional liberties.125  
Police and correctional officer liability generally, and Section 1983 liability 
specifically, have been studied in numerous jurisdictions and at a variety of 
conceptual levels.126  After grasping a comprehensive understanding of the 
Section 1983 literature, the focus of the project turns to the methodology 
employed in the study. 
III. DATA AND METHODS 
With increasing frequency and energy, law reviews are publishing the 
empirical research of legal scholars and social scientists.127  An essential 
 
118. See Eschholz, supra note 72, at 401 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)). 
119. See id. (citing Rhodes v. Champan, 452 U.S. 337, 363 (1981)). 
120. See id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839-40 (1994)). 
121. See id. (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)). 
122. Hall, supra note 14, at 529. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 535 (reporting that 27% of police officers and 6% of correctional officers stated 
that they had been sued). 
125. Worrall, supra note 4, at 28; Means, supra note 15, at 1. 
126. See Ross, supra note 5, at 507-12 (discussing trends in correctional officer civil liability 
cases); see also Eschholz, supra note 72, at 389-405 (studying how perpetrators of sexual violence 
justify their crimes); Vaughn, supra note 8, at 6-16 (reporting the findings of police chiefs’ views 
regarding legal liabilities); Hanser, supra note 72, at 460-74 (exploring the issue of officer liability 
in prison suicide cases); Hall, supra note 14, at 534-39 (providing results of officers’ attitudes and 
experiences with civil liability). 
127. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 83 
N.C. L. REV. 167, 167 (2004) (calling for, among other things, “law reviews to adopt a set of 
stringent disclosure requirements designed to foster critical review and replication of empirical 
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element of publishing such research is an explanation of the vital character-
istics of the data.128  In order to enable verification and duplication of the 
researcher’s study, it is necessary to present the critical methods used to 
obtain the project’s results.129 
A. DATA 
The main objective of the current project includes identifying the most 
common legal basis of Section 1983 claims in North Dakota and the agency 
policies most frequently implicated in the lawsuits.  To obtain this objec-
tive, content analysis was used.130  Content analysis is a quantitative 
research method of systemically analyzing and making inferences from 
text.131  The study’s population included all “reported” Section 1983 cases 
involving law enforcement and correctional agencies in North Dakota 
between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2007.132  The unit of analysis 
 
legal research”); Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (2002) 
(recognizing the then-apparent non-compliance of disclosure rules of many law reviews in pub-
lishing empirical analysis and adapting rules of inference to meet the “special needs, theories, and 
data [of] legal scholarship”); Richard L. Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 169, 171-80 (2002) (discussing, in part, contemporary methodological advances in 
empirical legal scholarship); Dennis Patterson, The Limits of Empiricism: What Facts Tell Us, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 2738, 2738 (2000) (encouraging more legal academic empirical information and 
stating that “empirical analysis is preferable to many scholarly alternatives now on offer in the law 
review literature”); Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 812 
(1999) (noting, approvingly, an increase in publication of empirical legal research amidst the 
predominantly theoretical and doctrinal scholarship of most law reviews). 
128. See Mitchell, supra footnote 127, at 200-01 (referencing requirements of the American 
Psychological Association Publication Manual, which applies to a great deal of social science 
literature, to include a section wherein the author “disclose[s] sufficient information to allow an-
other investigator to evaluate one’s methods and verify one’s results”). 
129. Id. at 200. 
130. See RUSSELL K. SCHUTT, INVESTIGATING THE SOCIAL WORLD 428-29 (5th ed. 2006) 
(explaining that content analysis is a useful method of conducting research when the material to be 
studied is in text format).  After reading through the text, the relevant material is categorized or 
coded based on variation and/or relationships among constructs in the text.  Id.  The coding pro-
duces numerical data based on observations of certain phenomena pre-determined by the 
researcher.  Id. The numerical data aids the researcher in making inferences regarding the subject 
in question.  Id.  The method by which the current project was coded and analyzed is detailed in 
Section III.B.  See discussion supra Section III.B (stating, in part, that the Section 1983 cases were 
officially reported between January 1997 and December 2007 by the District Court of North 
Dakota, and each such case was studied independently of the others). 
131. Id. 
132. In this study, “reported” means that the Section 1983 case was adjudicated by the 
United States District Court of North Dakota and published either in an official judicial reporter 
(e.g., F. Supp. 2d), and/or through the Westlaw and LexisNexis databases.  A potential weakness in 
limiting the scope of the project in this way was that cases that were settled, dismissed, or other-
wise disposed of without being reported were not captured.  However, obtaining Section 1983 
cases that were settled or otherwise disposed of without being reported is probably impracticable 
for this particular project given the existing cost and time limitations. 
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included forty-five Section 1983 cases reported by the District of North 
Dakota. 
B. METHODS 
The scope of the project was narrowed by defining the time period to 
cases officially reported between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2007.  
A search of all the Section 1983 cases in the United States Eighth Circuit 
court system (which includes the District of North Dakota) was con-
ducted.133  The search produced seventy-nine cases.  The cases were manu-
ally and individually reviewed word by word to ensure that each case was 
actually: (1) a District of North Dakota case; (2) a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 
case;134 and (3) only included once in the population.135  After performing 
this verification process, forty-five cases fit the qualifications of the popula-
tion.  Because forty-five cases is a reasonable number to review individ-
ually, the entire population was studied; sampling was not utilized.  In 
applying content analysis to each case, the data obtained was recorded into 
an electronic Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) file.136 
 
133. In order to complete the research, the Westlaw database was used to search for reported 
cases of Section 1983 claims.  The following search terms were employed: “42 U.S.C. Section 
1983”, “North Dakota”, and “police” or “sheriff” or “highway patrol.”  All terms inside quotations 
were marked as “required”; this means that the terms must be present within the structure of each 
case at least one time in order for the case to be considered.  The “Terms and Connectors” search 
function, rather than “Natural Language” function, was utilized because it allowed for the “order-
ing” of alternative wording.  By ordering the search, Westlaw was directed to search for cases that 
contained the terms “police” or “sheriff” or “highway patrol”, but only required that one of the 
three terms actually be present in the case.  
134. In word searches, the Westlaw software program often selects unrelated cases when 
numbers (i.e., the year “1983’) and terms used for multiple purposes (i.e., “42 U.S.C.”) are used.  
Therefore, the best way to protect against this glitch is to individually and manually verify each 
case before including it in the population. 
135. Ensuring that the case was only counted once is important because occasionally the 
Westlaw search included the district court case, as well as the appellate case in a higher court.  As 
a matter of methodical disclosure, when such instances occurred in this project, the district court 
case was used.  The reasoning for doing so was that at the district court all of the plaintiff’s claims 
are considered, whereas a case in a higher court may only consider those claims on appeal.  Since 
this project valued learning from all of the plaintiff’s claims, the district court case was used. 
136. The coding was as follows: (1) year in which the incident giving rise to the case 
occurred (values: 1985 to 2007, NA); (2) year in which the case was  reported (values: 1997 to 
2007, NA); (3) name of defendant-law enforcement agency; (4) gender of plaintiff (values: Male, 
Female, NA); (5) status of plaintiff (values: Inmate, Subject of a police investigation, Agency 
employee, Other, NA); (6) total number of constitutional amendments upon which the case was 
alleged to be grounded (values: 0-6, NA); (7) constitutional amendment(s) cited by plaintiff 
(values: 0, Amendments 1 to 27, other, NA); (8) total number of constitutional provisions upon 
which arguments were alleged to be grounded (values: 0-6, NA); (9) constitutional provision(s) 
cited by plaintiff (values: Free speech, Unreasonable search or seizure, Warrant violation, Double-
jeopardy, Assistance of counsel, Excessive bail, Cruel and unusual punishment, Due process, 
Deliberate indifference, Equal protection, Other, NA, NAP); (10) whether plaintiff was pro se 
(values: Yes, No, NA); (11) total number of agency policies implicated in plaintiff’s complaint 
(values: 0-6, NA); and (12) agency policies implicated in plaintiff’s complaint (values: Medical 
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IV. RESULTS 
The results of the project can be categorized into five main areas.  The 
areas consist of agencies involved, common characteristics of plaintiffs, and 
number of cases reported.  The legal authority and arguments used by plain-
tiffs, as well as the agency policies implicated are also included. 
A. AGENCIES INVOLVED 
Of the ninety-six state and local enforcement agencies studied, Section 
1983 claims were filed against officers of eighteen different agencies during 
January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2007.137  Employees of the North 
Dakota Department of Corrections were sued more than any other employ-
ees, being named in 44.4% of all reported cases.138  Even though the cities 
of Fargo and Bismarck have more residents than Grand Forks, the Grand 
Forks Police Department was named in more Section 1983 cases than both 
Fargo and Bismarck combined.139  In addition, employees of police 
departments in North Dakota were sued slightly more than those of sheriff’s 
offices.140 
 
care, Access to courts, Discipline and grievance procedures, Administrative liability, Conditions 
of confinement, Duty to protect, Use of force, Classification, Religious practice, Illegal search or 
seizure, Administrative segregation, Cruel and Unusual Punishments, Mail, Visitation, Mental 
health, Facilities, Unlawful detention or arrest, Unlawful stop, Employment policy, Access to 
attorney, Race discrimination, Other available, NA, NAP).  See infra Appendix A (listing the 
North Dakota Law Enforcement and Corrections Agencies).  
137. The agencies sued, as well as the corresponding valid percentile of which each agency 
sued, is as follows: Barnes County Sheriff 2.22%; Bottineau County Sheriff 2.22%; Burleigh 
County Sheriff 2.22%; Cass County Sheriff 2.22%; Dickinson County Sheriff 2.22%; Fargo 
Police 6.67%; Grafton Police 2.22%; Grand Forks Police 13.33%; Grand Forks County Sheriff 
2.22%; Griggs County Sheriff 2.22%; Jamestown Police 2.22%; Mountrail County Sheriff 2.22%; 
North Dakota Department of Corrections 44.44%; Rolette County Sheriff 2.22%; Stark County 
Sheriff 2.22%; Ward County Sheriff 2.22%; Williams County Sheriff 2.22%; and Williston Police 
2.22%. 
138. Of the forty-five Section 1983 cases reported between January 1, 1997 and December 
31, 2007, the North Dakota Department of Corrections was sued twenty times, or in 44.44% of the 
cases. 
139. See United States Census Bureau, State and County Quickfacts, 1, http://quickfacts. 
census.gov/qfd/states/38/3807200.html (last visited May 30, 2008) (stating that according to the 
2003 U.S. Census data estimate, Bismarck had 56,344 residents, Fargo maintained 91,484 resi-
dents, and 48,618 people lived in Grand Forks).  In the current study, neither Bismarck Police nor 
Burleigh County Sheriff was named in any reported Section 1983 actions.  Fargo Police, on the 
other hand, was sued in about 7% of all cases studied, and Grand Forks Police was sued in 15% of 
all cases.  Possible reasons that Fargo Police and Grand Forks Police, with their smaller popula-
tions, were named in more claims than Bismarck Police and Burleigh County Sheriff is not con-
clusively known at this time; in addition, speculation on this point is beyond the scope of the 
project. 
140. Police departments were named as defendants in 29% of all reported Section 1983 
cases, as compared to sheriff’s offices that were implicated in 27% of cases. 
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B. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF PLAINTIFFS 
An overwhelming majority of Section 1983 plaintiffs in North Dakota 
were men.  Only two of the forty-five cases studied were filed by women.141  
Of the twenty North Dakota Department of Corrections (ND DOCR) cases 
studied, 100% were filed by men.  In other words, although the Department 
of Corrections does in fact house female inmates, there were no reported 
Section 1983 cases that were filed by female inmates. 
As shown in Figure 1, the plaintiff in each case was categorized as 
being an inmate, a subject in a police investigation, or an agency employee; 
the categories were mutually exclusive and exhaustive.  Interestingly, 
plaintiffs were subjects of a police investigation in about 26% of the cases 
studied.  In addition, subjects of police investigations sued officers from 
only seven North Dakota law enforcement agencies.142  Of all the plaintiffs 
studied, approximately 9% were agency employees.143 
 
141. Males were plaintiffs in about 96% of all reported cases, whereas females were named 
in 4% of cases.  Interestingly, the female plaintiffs both sued the Grand Forks Police Department. 
142. Subjects of investigation filed Section 1983 claims against officers from the following 
law enforcement agencies: Grand Forks Police (four times), Bottineau County Sheriff, Mountrail 
County Sheriff, Stark County Sheriff, Dickinson Police, Jamestown Police, and Fargo Police 
(twice). 
143. Employees of the following agencies sued their supervisors: Grafton Police, Barnes 
County Sheriff, Grand Forks Police, and Griggs County Sheriff. 
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Figure 1 
 
STATUS OF PLAINTIFF 
STATUS FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE (%) 
Inmate 29 64.44 
Subject of Investigation 12 26.67 
Agency Employee 4 8.89 
Total 45 100.00 
 
Remarkably, 64% of the cases were filed by inmates.  Of these inmate-
plaintiffs, about 44% claimed Section 1983 violations against employees of 
the ND DOCR.  The remaining inmate-plaintiffs filed suits against correc-
tional officers employed by county jails.144  About 93% of the inmate-plain-
tiffs filed claims without the assistance of legal counsel.  Overall, 64% of 
the cases studied were filed by pro se plaintiffs.145 
C. NUMBER OF CASES REPORTED 
An average of 2.2 cases was reported each year from 1997 to 2006.146  
Significantly though, in 2007, twenty-three cases were reported by the 
court.  Of these, eleven of the incidents underlying the lawsuits actually 
occurred in 2007; the remaining incidents took place in previous years.  
One of the first possible reasons for such an explosion of reported cases in 
2007 could be a large increase in prisoner population.  As Figure 2 shows, 
the prisoner population in North Dakota increased throughout the entire 
span of the study, with an aggregate increase of about 74%.  However, the 
large number of Section 1983 cases in 2007 cannot be explained solely by 
an increase in prisoner population because the smallest increase in prisoner 
population (about 1%) actually occurred in the same year as the significant 
increase of cases.  Instead, some factor outside the scope of this study 
almost certainly was the primary contributor for the large increase in cases 
reported in 2007.147 
 
144. The defendant-officers were employed by sheriff’s offices in the following counties: 
Bottineau, Mountrail (twice), Williams, Rolette, Barnes, Ward, Stark, Griggs, and Cass. 
145. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1258 (8th ed. 2004) (defining pro se plaintiffs as those 
that represent themselves “in a court proceeding without the assistance of a lawyer”). 
146. The total number of cases reviewed for the first time from 1997 to 2006 was twenty-
two. 
147. Given that the 2007 data represents the most recent and available information, the study 
is not able to determine whether the factor represents a unique occurrence or signals a 
fundamental change in the nature of the North Dakota prison population. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENTS EMPLOYED BY PLAINTIFFS 
Importantly, the study considered the constitutional authority and 
accompanying arguments employed by each of the forty-five Section 1983 
plaintiffs.  Although the entire findings are shown in Figure 3, the most 
notable include the fact that a Fourteenth Amendment violation was alleged 
in 42% of the cases.  The Eighth Amendment was cited 35% of the time.  In 
addition, the plaintiff made the fatal error of not making any constitutional 
connection to his Section 1983 claim in 5% of the cases; all of these cases 
were initiated by pro se inmate-plaintiffs.148 
 
148. Worthy of note is the fact that the “legal authority” categories were not considered 
mutually exclusive, although they were exhaustive.  Meaning, if a plaintiff cited the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, the plaintiff was recorded as having implicated both authorities.  As 
shown in Figure 3, there were seventy-six constitutional amendments cited to in forty-five cases.  
In addition, although the scope of the study was open to all amendments cited by plaintiffs, only 
those amendments actually cited at least once are listed in Figure 3. 
ND DOCR 
AVERAGE INMATE POPULATION 
Calendar 
Year 
Average Number of 
State Prisoner 
Population 
Increase in Prisoner 
Population (%) 
1997 819 15.80 
1998 902 10.13 
1999 931 3.22 
2000 1016 9.13 
2001 1099 8.17 
2002 1160 5.55 
2003 1198 3.28 
2004 1299 8.43 
2005 1373 5.70 
2006 1409 2.62 
2007 1429 1.42 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In considering the actual arguments and constitutional clauses used, the 
study found that plaintiffs alleged some type of due process violation in 
almost 32% of the cases.  Deliberate indifference was argued in approxi-
mately 19% of cases.  The other legal arguments employed by Section 1983 
plaintiffs are detailed in Figure 4.149 
In 52% of the cases, the plaintiff cited more than one constitutional 
amendment violation.  But, in only 13% of the cases did the plaintiff assert 
more than two constitutional violation claims.  In almost 57% of all cases, 
the plaintiff employed more than one argument to support his constitutional 
violation claim(s).  In about 23% of the cases, more than two arguments 
were used to support the claim(s).  Five arguments were the most any 
plaintiff ever used to support his claim(s). 
 
149. Similar to the structure of the legal authority categories, the categories of constitutional 
provisions were not considered mutually exclusive.  This means that if a plaintiff employed a free 
speech argument, as well as a due process argument, the plaintiff was recorded as having used 
both arguments.  As such, there were eighty-five constitutional provisions or arguments made in 
forty-five Section 1983 cases.  In addition to those legal arguments listed in Figure 4, the study 
looked for plaintiffs to cite double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and excessive bail arguments.  
Because these three arguments were not employed at least once in the population of cases, they 
are not listed in Figure 4. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS CITED BY 
NORTH DAKOTA SECTION 1983 PLAINTIFFS 
 
AMENDMENT FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
(%) 
I 12 15.79 
IV 8 10.53 
VI 4 5.26 
VIII 16 21.05 
XIV 32 42.11 
None 4 5.26 
TOTAL 76 100.00 
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Figure 4 
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION EMPLOYED BY 
NORTH DAKOTA SECTION 1983 PLAINTIFFS 
 
PROVISION/ 
ARGUMENT 
NUMBER 
OF 
INSTANCES 
PERCENTAGE 
(%) 
Free Speech 7 8.24 
Unreasonable 
Search/Seizure 
5 5.88 
Warrant Violation 2 2.35 
Assist. Of Counsel 2 2.35 
Cruel & Usual 
Punishment 
3 3.53 
Due Process 27 31.77 
Deliberate Indifference 16 18.82 
Equal Protection 8 9.41 
Other 11 12.94 
None 4 4.71 
TOTAL 85 100.00 
 
E. POLICIES IMPLICATED 
In the most substantively rich portion of the findings, the agency poli-
cies implicated in each case of the population were studied.  Figure 5 pro-
vides the statistical details of the findings, but of particular note is the 
finding that the policy most frequently cited was that of providing medical 
care to incarcerated persons.  In addition, the discipline and grievance pro-
cedures of agencies were frequently implicated.  Likewise, plaintiffs were 
especially concerned with North Dakota agencies’ use of force policies.  
With specific regard to correctional agencies, plaintiffs commonly filed 
Section 1983 claims questioning agencies’ administrative segregation and 
mail privileges policies. 
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Figure 5 
 
NORTH DAKOTA LAW ENFORCEMENT & CORRECTIONS 
AGENCY POLICIES IMPLICATED IN SECTION 1983 CLAIMS 
 
 Number of 
Policies 
Implicated 
Percentage 
(%) 
ND 
DOCR 
Cases 
ND 
Sheriff 
Office 
Cases 
ND Police 
Department 
Cases 
Medical Care 9 10.58 8 1 0 
Discipline/Grievience 
Proceedings 
7 8.24 7 0 0 
Duty to Protect 5 5.88 3 1 1 
Unlawful Search & 
Seizure 
5 5.88 2 2 1 
Mail 5 5.88 4 1 0 
Administrative 
Segregation 5 5.88 5 0 0 
Unlawful 
Detainment/Arrest 
4 4.71 0 2 2 
Employment Policy  4 4.71 0 2 2 
Conditions of 
Confinement 
4 4.71 3 0 1 
Access to Courts 3 3.53 1 2 0 
Mental Health 3 3.53 1 2 0 
Use of Force 3 3.53 1 0 2 
Religious Practice 2 2.35 2 0 0 
Access to Attorney 2 2.35 0 2 0 
Race Discrimination 2 2.35 1 1 0 
Cruel & Unusual 
Punishment 
1 1.18 1 0 0 
Visitation 1 1.18 0 1 0 
Administrative 
Liability 
1 1.18 1 0 0 
Other Available 19 22.35 7 5 7 
Not Available 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 85 100.00 47 
(55.29) 
22 (25.88) 16 (18.82) 
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We can draw several preliminary conclusions from the data presented.  
The majority of Section 1983 claims in North Dakota are filed by inmate-
plaintiffs.  Although there are ninety-six state and local law enforcement/ 
correctional agencies in North Dakota, only eighteen were named in Section 
1983 lawsuits over the last eleven years.  The number of reported Section 
1983 lawsuits against North Dakota law enforcement and corrections agen-
cies dramatically increased in 2007.  The most commonly cited constitu-
tional claims were Fourteenth Amendment due process and Eighth 
Amendment cruel and unusual punishment violations.  The arguments most 
frequently used to support the plaintiffs’ claims included due process, delib-
erate indifference, and equal protection arguments.  The group of policies 
implicated most commonly involved medical care for inmates.  Agency 
policies governing discipline and grievances procedures, including those 
intended for both inmates and agency employees, were also frequently 
questioned. 
V. DISCUSSION 
The significance of the results of the project is best understood when 
properly placed in the context of three issues.  First, is Section 1983 overly 
burdensome on law enforcement and correctional agencies in North 
Dakota?  Second, how do North Dakota’s Section 1983 statistical trends 
compare to those of other jurisdictions?  And third, what can North Dakota 
agencies do to improve and strengthen their administrative policies? 
A. IS SECTION 1983 BURDENSOME TO NORTH DAKOTA AGENCIES? 
The first issue to consider is the extent to which Section 1983 burdens 
North Dakota agencies.  In 1995, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (PLRA) to reduce the high number of frivolous and meritless 
lawsuits filed by prisoners, of which Section 1983 may be included.150  In 
examining other jurisdictions, Ross’s study noted dramatic increases in 
Section 1983 lawsuits (sometimes as much as doubling previous increases) 
and correlated a significant portion of the increase to the ever-ballooning 
number of federal prisoners.151  Such dramatic increases in a relatively short 
period of time represent at least one way that Section 1983 claims burden 
 
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1996); Pipes v. North Dakota, No. 1:07-CV-00067, 2007 WL 
4661655, *1 (D.N.D. Dec. 10, 2007) 
151. Ross, supra note 5, at 507. 
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some law enforcement and correctional agencies across the United 
States.152 
In North Dakota, the number of reported Section 1983 lawsuits 
remained relatively constant from 1997 to 2006, with an average of 2.2 
reported cases per year.153  In 2007 however, the number sky-rocketed to 
twenty-two reported cases in one year.154  North Dakota’s Section 1983 
caseload from 1997 to 2006 appears to be quite modest compared to the 
overall load experienced in Ross’s study of all federal judicial districts.155  
However, the number of Section 1983 cases reported in 2007 increased 
more than 900% over the average number of cases reported in the previous 
ten years.  This significant increase is important evidence that the Section 
1983 caseload may be a heavy burden on law enforcement and correctional 
agencies in North Dakota. 
Evaluating the burden of Section 1983 cases in North Dakota can also 
occur by determining the number of reported cases filed by pro se plaintiffs.  
In Ross’s study, about 90% of the Section 1983 claims were filed by pro se 
plaintiffs.156  In North Dakota, about two-thirds of the plaintiffs filed 
without the assistance of counsel. 
In the Eighth Circuit, of which North Dakota is part, courts must 
liberally construe complaints filed by pro se inmates and must ascertain 
whether the complaint may provide relief “on any possible theory.”157  This, 
in essence, amounts “to a less stringent standard than what would be 
required of attorneys.”158  On a practical level, the mandate significantly 
increases the amount of time the court must spend in reviewing and 
deciphering what many times are ill-pled motions of pro se plaintiffs.159  
Therefore, the strain inherent in pro se filings in North Dakota is 
 
152. See Vaughn, supra note 8, at 3 (concurring that some law enforcement officers report 
they are burdened by various forms of civil liability). 
153. This statistic stands true even though the average inmate population in North Dakota 
increased by about 72% over the same time period. 
154. Twenty-two Section 1983 cases were reported from 1997 to 2006, as compared to 
twenty-three cases reported in 2007 alone. 
155. See Ross, supra note 5, at 507-09.  
156. Id. at 509. 
157. Haley v. Dormire, 845 F.2d 1488, 1490 (8th Cir. 1988); Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 
714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974). 
158. Pipes v. North Dakota, No. 1:07-CV-00067, 2007 WL 4661655, *2 (D.N.D. Dec. 10, 
2007) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007)). 
159. See, e.g., id. at *1 (“The complaint filed by Pipes is approximately forty pages in length 
and contains several narratives in which Pipes attempts to describe his claims. The lack of 
reference to any particular federal constitutional or statutory right, however, makes it difficult to 
discern exactly what his claims are.”). 
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noteworthy (64% of plaintiffs filed pro se), but comparatively speaking, are 
not as heavy as the burden placed on federal courts at large.160 
B. HOW DO THE SECTION 1983 STATISTICAL TRENDS OF NORTH 
DAKOTA COMPARE? 
In order for law enforcement and correctional agencies in North Dakota 
to more fully familiarize themselves with Section 1983 claims and to accu-
rately situate themselves among other Section 1983 jurisdictions, this study 
discusses statistical data related to Section 1983 cases.  The data can be 
categorized in three ways.  First, in Hall’s study of various jurisdictions, 
substantially more law enforcement officers were sued than correctional 
officers.161  In North Dakota, the exact opposite phenomenon exists—
correctional officers were sued more than law enforcement officers.162 
Second, in Vaughn’s study of police chiefs in Texas, about one-fourth 
of the cases maintained allegations of excessive use of force violations.163  
Officers in North Dakota agencies fared considerably better in that only 
about 7% of the cases alleged excessive use of force violations.  Similarly, 
police chiefs in Texas reported that claims of false arrest/imprisonment/ 
detention accounted for 19% of the civil lawsuits.164  In North Dakota, the 
same alleged violations existed in only half as many cases.  In addition, the 
percentage of unlawful search or seizure allegations in North Dakota cases 
was about the same (11%) as the unlawful search or seizure allegations in 
Texas (10%).165 
Third, some of the agency policies implicated in Ross’s study of all 
federal judicial circuits are the same as those implicated in the North 
Dakota cases.166  Several statistical and substantive tools exist for deter-
mining similarity and difference between two groups of data.167  One tool, 
the “t-test,” examines the statistical difference between means, or averages, 
 
160. See Ross, supra note 5, at 509 (reporting that 92% of the Section 1983 claims were filed 
by plaintiffs not represented by counsel). 
161. Hall, supra note 14, at 535. 
162. In the present study, inmates sued corrections officials in 29 of 45 cases.  In the 
remaining sixteen cases, law enforcement officials were sued by subjects of investigation (12 of 
45), and agency employees (4 of 45). 
163. Vaughn, supra note 8, at 8. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. See Ross, supra note 5, at 510 (showing, for example, that medical care policies were 
implicated 362 times, which is equivalent to 11% of the filings); see also supra Figure 5 
(illustrating that medical care policies were implicated in about 11% of the North Dakota cases). 
167. EVAN M. BERMAN, ESSENTIAL STATISTICS FOR PUBLIC MANAGER AND POLICY 
ANALYSTS 180 (2d ed. 2007). 
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of two variables.168  Translated into layman’s terms, the average number of 
cases that implicate medical care policies in the North Dakota study were 
compared against the average number of cases that implicate medical care 
policies in the Ross study.  If the comparison was within a statistically 
approved range of acceptance, the relationship between the two variables 
was deemed “significant.”169 
Here, the North Dakota project found that in almost all policies there 
was no statistical relationship between the two studies’ findings (see 
Appendix C).170  However, two other factors suggest that similarity be-
tween the two studies does exist.171  First, the studies are similar in that they 
both reported an increase in the average prisoner population over the span 
of their respective time periods.172  In addition, the cases in both studies 
employed the same constitutional amendments and provisions (see Figures 
3 and 4).173 
 
168. Id. at 180-81. 
169. See id. at 4-6, 162-68 (discussing various techniques for testing similarity and differ-
ence between two groups of data). 
170. The null hypothesis is that there is no statistical relationship between the North Dakota 
policies implicated in Section 1983 claims and those policies implicated in other American juris-
dictions.  The null hypothesis was tested at a confidence level of 95%.  Appendix C provides the 
numerical data used to calculate the t-test.  For example, with regard to the policy of medical care 
to inmates, the test value is 1.443.  Because 1.443 is not greater than the critical value of 1.96, the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  Similarly, the test value for disciplinary and grievance policies 
(1.328) is less than the critical value (1.96), so the null cannot be rejected.  Practically speaking, 
this means that according to the t-test difference of means, we cannot reject the hypothesis that 
there is not a relationship between the policies implicated in Section 1983 claims in North Dakota 
and policies implicated in Section 1983 claims in other jurisdictions.  One possible explanation for 
the results of the low t-test is that the numbers of cases in which various agency policies in North 
Dakota are implicated are not sufficiently adequate to receive a higher test value.  For instance, as 
shown in Appendix C, most of the cells in the North Dakota study contain numbers such as three, 
five, and seven.  In this case, low values in the cells likely contribute to a smaller t-test value.  In 
addition, the current study includes more information than Ross provided with regard to all of the 
policies implicated in any given case.  This means that although Ross studied considerably more 
cases than the present project, Ross analyzed the case based exclusively on what he considered to 
be the primary argument of the case.  Email from Darrel L. Ross, Department of Law Enforce-
ment & Justice Administration Chair, Western Illinois University, to Jared W. Rigby, Author 
(Mar. 21, 2008, 13:03:16 CDT) (on file with author).  In the present study, all policies and argu-
ments reported by the court were included in the analysis.  Therefore, a t-test involving Ross’s 
study which only included one of the potentially several policies may have influenced a slightly 
lower value than would have otherwise existed. 
171. Compare Ross, supra note 5, at 508 (discussing the inmate level in the federal system) 
with supra Figure 2 (reporting on the North Dakota inmate level); compare also Ross, supra note 
5, at 507 (discussing the number of constitutional amendments cited in most jurisdictions) with 
supra Figure 2 (reporting the constitutional amendments cited in North Dakota cases). 
172. Compare Ross, supra note 5, at 508 (illustrating that, with the exception of one year, the 
number of inmates in the federal prison system increased from 1970 to 1994) with supra Figure 2 
(showing that the number of inmates at the ND DOCR increased from 1997 to 2007). 
173. Compare Ross, supra note 5, at 507 (stating, for example, that inmates in most jurisdic-
tions commonly employ more than one constitutional amendment in Section 1983 cases) with 
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Overall, the statistical data discussed above enables North Dakota 
agencies and officers to identify their Section 1983 situation relative to their 
counterparts in other states.  In events such as an increase in prisoner 
population, the employment of constitutional amendments and provisions, 
and an increase in Section 1983 cases, North Dakota appears to be similar 
to most jurisdictions.  However, in terms of the policies implicated, North 
Dakota may exhibit a statistically different experience than most other 
jurisdictions. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING NORTH DAKOTA 
POLICIES 
Drawing upon the findings of the current study, three recommendations 
exist for North Dakota law enforcement and correctional agencies.  First, 
agencies should review and update their existing policies.  Second, individ-
ual agencies or the state should conduct a study that focuses on the deci-
sions and behavior of those that perpetuate the policy violations.174  Third, 
agencies should provide regular training and educational opportunities 
wherein employees learn about issues regarding agency and personal 
liability.175 
1. Review and Update Policies 
The first step North Dakota law enforcement and correctional agencies 
should take is to review and update their respective policies with an eye 
toward further protecting individuals’ constitutional rights and liberties.176  
This recommendation is not given with the assumption that the policy, as 
opposed to some other factor such as improper action taken by officers, was 
the sole and direct cause of the Section 1983 claim.  Rather, in recommend-
ing policy reviews, this study merely intends to rule out or improve agency 
policy before tackling more complicated issues such as officer training.  
Generally speaking, agencies ought to begin their review with medical care 
and disciplinary/grievance procedures because these policies were impli-
cated in Section 1983 cases most often.  After this is accomplished, agen-
cies might consider focusing their attention on policies that govern duty to 
 
supra Part IV.D (reporting, for example, that plaintiffs in North Dakota cited more than one 
constitutional amendment violation in 52% of the cases). 
174. See Ross, supra note 5, at 513 (agreeing that “[a] systematic review and development of 
policies and procedures is necessary to keep personnel performing their job duties commensurate 
with the law”). 
175. See id. (recognizing that new officers typically receive adequate training to start their 
positions, but that regular in-service training “frequently suffers”). 
176. See id. (concurring in the need to protect individuals’ constitutional rights). 
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protect, search and seizure, and where applicable, their administrative 
segregation, and inmate mail issues. 
2. Study Those That Actually Violate Section 1983 
Second, under conditions that are feasible to North Dakota agencies, 
further studies of Section 1983 claims should be conducted.177  Whereas the 
current study focused on the individuals that initiated the Section 1983 
claims (the plaintiffs), additional agency-led studies ought to concentrate on 
characteristics that are similar among those that actually violate the agency 
policies (the defendant-officers).  By doing this, agency administrators will 
increase their understanding of the environment, circumstances, and ration-
ales of defendant-officers’ actions and behavior.178  In turn, an understand-
ing from the perspective of the errant officers will assist administrators in 
reducing agency liability and responding through training tailored to the 
needs of individual agencies.179 
3. Regularly Train and Educate Employees 
The third recommendation is that agencies consider establishing a 
regular training time each month wherein specific policies are presented and 
discussed.180  An important element to training officers in Section 1983 
issues is to include an education component in the training.  When accom-
plished properly, the education component will focus on obtaining a broad 
perspective of the Section 1983 issue, whereas traditional training often 
consists of essentially listing the “dos” and “don’ts” associated with avoid-
ing agency and personal liability.  The first objective of an education com-
ponent in the Section 1983 context is to show employees why certain 
speech and conduct are not legal and appropriate.  Applied to officers, for 
instance, this may mean that referring to people of color using derogatory 
terms may lead to or be per se evidence of treating others unequally.181 
The second objective is to convince the trainees that language and 
behavior should conform to the principles communicated in the training 
portion because it is in their best personal interest to treat others fairly, 
 
177. See id. at 513-14 (calling for correctional agencies to examine their individual systems). 
178. See Eschholz, supra note 72, at 401 (agreeing that a study of the circumstances under-
lying agency and officer liability ought to be conducted). 
179. See Vaughn, supra note 8, at 22-23 (concurring that Section 1983 experiences differ 
across jurisdictions and that the needs of various jurisdictions, including training, may also vary 
depending on the jurisdiction). 
180. See id. at 23 (agreeing that regular and meaningful training reduces liability). 
181. See id.  (concurring that officers that speak as though they do not treat people fairly and 
equally should be carefully observed by supervisors because those officers likely do treat individ-
uals unfairly and unequally). 
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equally, and with care.182  To officers, this may mean that policy violations 
lead to disciplinary action, whereas favorable reviews offered by clients, co-
workers, and supervisors lead to organizational rewards.  In addition, on a 
personal level, Section 1983 allegations may lead to some taint or loss of 
favorable reputation for officers named in Section 1983 actions. 
In short, North Dakota law enforcement and correctional agencies 
ought to strengthen their policies by conducting reviews and updates with 
the intention of protecting individuals’ constitutional rights and liberties.  In 
addition, agencies should, where feasible, study Section 1983 cases by con-
centrating on characteristics that are similar among those that actually 
violate the agency policies.  Furthermore, agencies need to establish regular 
training wherein agency policies are discussed and employees are educated 
as to how compliance with policy benefits others and themselves. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Section 1983 cases in North Dakota and the majority of other 
jurisdictions intersect and diverge depending on the particular issue con-
sidered.  In this study of the most recent eleven years, the constitutional 
amendments and provisions employed in reported North Dakota cases are 
similar to those used in other jurisdictions throughout the United States.  In 
addition, the agency policies implicated in North Dakota cases are, in 
several ways, similar to those challenged in other jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, like most other jurisdictions, the inmate population in 
North Dakota increased over the span of the study.  And, a large number of 
inmate-plaintiffs in both studies filed without the assistance of counsel.  
Unlike some jurisdictions, however, plaintiffs of reported Section 1983 
cases in North Dakota more frequently sued correctional officers than law 
enforcement officers.  Additionally, the plaintiffs are most frequently in-
mates incarcerated with the North Dakota Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation or one of the jails in North Dakota. 
Generally speaking, the present project found that from 1997 to 2007 
the agency policies most commonly implicated in Section 1983 cases in 
North Dakota included those dealing with medical care to inmates and 
disciplinary and grievance procedures for inmates and employees.  North 
Dakota agencies and plaintiffs alike will be better served as the afore-
mentioned agency policies are reevaluated and, where applicable, updated.  
Either the state or individual agencies should consider conducting studies 
wherein the characteristics common to those that actually violate their 
 
182. See id. at 23 (agreeing that treating citizens fairly reduces lawsuits). 
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policies are examined.  Regular training that incorporates an education 
component will more likely convince officers to tailor their communication, 
actions, and decisions to constitutional mandates. 
Overall, this study is important because it identifies Section 1983 
issues that North Dakota law enforcement and correctional agencies and 
officers have recently been accused of violating.  The study also provides 
agencies with data and recommendations that will enable agencies and 
officers to avoid Section 1983 violations.  Most importantly, the data and 
recommendations will allow agencies and officers to conduct their essential 
missions of public service while protecting individuals’ fundamental 
constitutional rights and liberties. 
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APPENDIX A 
NORTH DAKOTA LAW ENFORCEMENT & 
CORRECTIONS AGENCIES 
North Dakota Department of  
Corrections 
North Dakota Highway Patrol 
Adams County Sheriff’s Office 
Barnes County Sheriff’s Office 
Valley City Police Department 
Benson County Sheriff’s Office 
Billings County Sheriff’s Office 
Bottineau County Sheriff’s Office 
Bowman County Sheriff’s Office 
Bowman Police Department 
Burke County Sheriff’s Office 
Burleigh County Sheriff’s Office 
Bismarck Police Department 
Lincoln Police Department 
Cass County Sheriff’s Office 
Fargo Police Department 
West Fargo Police Department 
Cavalier County Sheriff’s Office 
Dickey County Sheriff’s Office 
Oakes Police Department 
Divide County Sheriff’s Office 
Crosby Police Department 
Dunn County Sheriff’s Office 
Eddy County Sheriff’s Office 
Emmons County Sheriff’s Office 
Linton Police Department 
Foster County Sheriff’s Office 
Carrington Police Department 
Golden Valley County Sheriff’s 
Office 
Grand Forks County Sheriff’s 
Office 
Emerado Police Department 
Grand Forks Police Department 
Larimore Police Department 
Northwood Police Department 
Thompson Police Department 
Grant County Sheriff’s Office 
Griggs County Sheriff’s Office 
Hettinger County Sheriff’s Office 
Kidder County Sheriff’s Office 
Steele Police Department 
LaMoure County Sheriff’s Office 
Logan County Sheriff’s Office 
Napoleon Police Department 
McHenry County Sheriff’s Office 
McIntosh County Sheriff’s Office 
Wishek Police Department 
McKenzie County Sheriff’s Office 
Watford City Police Department 
McLean County Sheriff’s Office 
Mercer County Sheriff’s Office 
Beulah Police Department 
Hazen Police Department 
Morton County Sheriff’s Office 
Mandan Police Department 
Mountrail County Sheriff’s Office 
Nelson County Sheriff’s Office 
Oliver County Sheriff’s Office 
Pembina County Sheriff’s Office 
Cavalier Police Department 
Pierce County Sheriff’s Office 
Rugby Police Department 
Ramsey County Sheriff’s Office 
Devils Lake Police Department 
Ransom County Sheriff’s Office 
Lisbon Police Department 
Renville County Sheriff’s Office 
Richland County Sheriff’s Office 
Wahpeton Police Department 
Rolette County Sheriff’s Office 
Rolla Police Department 
Sergeant County Sheriff’s Office 
Sheridan County Sheriff’s Office 
Sioux County Sheriff’s Office 
Slope County Sheriff’s Office 
Stark County Sheriff’s Office 
Dickinson Police Department 
Steele County Sheriff’s Office 
Stutsman County Sheriff’s Office 
Jamestown Police Department 
Towner County Sheriff’s Office 
Traill County Sheriff’s Office 
Mayville Police Department 
Portland Police Department 
Hillsboro Police Department 
Walsh County Sheriff’s Office 
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Grafton Police Department 
Ward County Sheriff’s Office 
Minot Police Department 
Wells County Sheriff’s Office 
Harvey Police Department 
Fessenden Police Department 
Williams County Sheriff’s Office 
Williston Police Department 
NDSCS Police Department 
NDSU Police Department 
UND Police Department 
Other 
NA 
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APPENDIX B 
LIST OF POPULATION (OF CASES) 
1. Poolman v. City of Grafton, N.D., 487 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2007). 
2. Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2005). 
3. Blades v. Schuetzle, 302 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 2002). 
4. Burke v. North Dakota Dept. of Corrs. and Rehab., 294 F.3d 1043 (8th Cir. 2002). 
5. Hulse v. Hall, 205 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1999). 
6. Pipes v. North Dakota, No. 1:07-CV-00067, 2007 WL 4661655 
 (D.N.D. Dec. 10, 2007). (Against Bottineau County Sheriff). 
7. Pipes v. North Dakota, No. 1:07-CV-00067, 2007 WL 4661655 
 (D.N.D. Dec. 10, 2007).  (Against North Dakota Department of Corrections). 
8. Steinbach v. Branson, No. 1:05-CV-101, 2007 WL 2985571 (D.N.D. Oct. 9, 2007). 
9. Johnson v. Welte, No. CIV. 3:06-CV-89, 2007 WL 2790666 (D.N.D. Sept. 24, 
 2007).  (Against Grand Forks City Police, before incarceration). 
10. Johnson v. Welte, No. CIV. 3:06-CV-89, 2007 WL 2790666 
 (D.N.D. Sept. 24, 2007). (Against Grand Forks City Police, during incarceration). 
11. Moore v. Bertsch, No. 105-CV-098, 2007 WL 2410346 (D.N.D. Aug. 21, 2007). 
12. Tweed v. Schuetzle, No. 1:06-CV-032, 2007 WL 2050782 (D.N.D. July 12, 2007). 
 (Plaintiff was Tweed). 
13. Tweed v. Schuetzle, No. 1:06-CV-032, 2007 WL 2050782 (D.N.D. July 12, 2007). 
 (Plaintiff was Moses). 
14. Wedemeyer v. City of Williston unknown transport officers, No. 107-CV-033, 
 2007 WL 1855050 (D.N.D. June 26, 2007). (Against Williston City Police). 
15. Wedemeyer v. City of Williston unknown transport officers, No. 107-CV-033, 
 2007 WL 1855050 (D.N.D. June 26, 2007). (Against Williams County Sheriff). 
16. Wedemeyer v. City of Williston unknown transport officers, No. 107-CV-033, 
 2007 WL 1855050 (D.N.D. June 26, 2007). 
 (Against North Dakota Department of Corrections). 
17. Cody v. White, No. 3:06-CV-18, 2007 WL 1726583 (D.N.D. June 13, 2007). 
18. Odom v. Brutger Equities, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-038, 2007 WL 1611923 
 (D.N.D. June 01, 2007). 
19. Clifford v. Mueller, No. 3:07-CV-44, 2007 WL 1521043 (D.N.D. May 22, 2007). 
20. Burke v. North Dakota Dept. of Corrs. and Rehab., No. 1:07 CV 004, 2007 WL 
 1456217 (D.N.D. May 16, 2007). 
21. Moore v. Schuetzle, No. 1:06-CV-079, 2006 WL 3612857 (D.N.D. Nov. 20, 2006). 
 (Against North Dakota Department of Corrections) 
22. Moore v. Schuetzle, No. 1:06-CV-079, 2006 WL 3612857 (D.N.D. Nov. 20, 2006). 
 (Against Fargo City Police). 
23. Mora v. North Dakota, No. 1:07-CV-023, 2007 WL 1147060 
 (D.N.D. Mar. 29, 2007). 
24. Garcia v. Schull, No. 2:05-CV-50, 2007 WL 295614 (D.N.D. Jan. 29, 2007). 
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 (Against Grand Forks City Police). 
25. Garcia v. Schull, No. 2:05-CV-50, 2007 WL 295614 (D.N.D. Jan. 29, 2007). 
 (Against Grand Forks County Sheriff). 
26. Hart v. Bertsch, No. 1:06-CV-080, 2006 WL 3544393 (D.N.D. Nov. 2, 2006). 
27. Kunze v. Bertsch, No. 1:05-CV-104, 2006 WL 267150 (D.N.D. Jan. 4, 2006). 
28. Shape v. Barnes County, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (D.N.D. Oct. 14, 2005). 
29. Brown ex rel. Indigenous Inmates at N.D. State Prison v. Schuetzle, 368 F.Supp.2d 
 1009 (D.N.D. May 4, 2005). 
30. Harvey v. County of Ward, 352 F.Supp.2d 1003 (D.N.D. 2005). 
31. Kunze v. Rauser, 332 F.Supp.2d 1269 (D.N.D. 2004). 
32. Moore v. Bachmeier, No. A1-04-38, 2004 WL 1167380 (D.N.D. May 25, 2004). 
33. Damron v. North Dakota Com’r of Corrs., 299 F.Supp.2d 970 (D.N.D. 2004). 
34. Daniels v. Anderson, No. A1-02-125, 2003 WL 21704396 (D.N.D. July 15, 2003). 
 (Against Stark County Sheriff). 
35. Daniels v. Anderson, No. A1-02-125, 2003 WL 21704396 (D.N.D. July 15, 2003). 
 (Against Dickinson City Police). 
36. Shirley v. Dietz, No. A3-99-120, 2000 WL 33340305 (D.N.D. Nov. 7, 2000). 
37. Westfall v. City of Grand Forks, No. A2-99-2, 2000 WL 33339627 
 (D.N.D. Aug. 2, 2000). 
38. Hendrickson v. Griggs County ex rel. Bd. of County Comm’r, No. A3-99-36, 2000  
 WL 33339621 (D.N.D. April 18, 2000). 
39. Schneeweis v. City of Grand Forks, No. A3-98-76, 1999 WL 33279853 
 (D.N.D. July 15, 1999). 
40. Burke v. Meyers, No. A3-97-99, 1998 WL 1780695 (D.N.D. July 27, 1998). 
41. Copper v. City of Fargo, No. A3-93-130, 1998 WL 1780672 
 (D.N.D. Mar. 31, 1998). 
42. Veneklase v. City of Fargo, No. A3-93-156, 1998 WL 1780688 
 (D.N.D. Mar. 31, 1998). 
43. Pipes v. North Dakota, No. 1:07-CV-00067, 2007 WL 4661655 
 (D.N.D. Dec. 10, 2007). (Against Mountrail County Sheriff). 
44. Pipes v. North Dakota, No. 1:07-CV-00067, 2007 WL 4661655 
 (D.N.D. December 10, 2007). (Against North Dakota Department of Corrections). 
45. Billings v. North Dakota State Penitentiary, No. 1:07-CV-066, 2007 WL 4380056 
 (D.N.D. Oct. 26, 2007). 
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Employment Policy 4 
(8 9) 
0 
x=0 09 
— 
0 0 0 0 
Access to Attorney 
2 
(4 44) 
0 
x=0 04 
— 
0 0 
2 
(2 22) 
0 
Race 
Discrimination 
2 
(4 44) 
0 
x=0 04 
— 
1 
(1 11) 
0 
1 
(1 11) 
0 
Other Available 
19 
(42 2) 
0 
x=0 04 
— 
7 0 6 0 
Not Available 
0 
(0) 
0 — 2 0 4 0 
Total Policies 
Implemented 
85 
3205 
(100 00) 
—     
Total Cases Studied 45 
(100 00) 
3205 
(100 00) 
— 49 
(54 43%)  
1864 
(58%) 
21 
(23 32%) 
1341 
(42%) 
